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Abstract 
Credit greases the wheels of oil consumption—it is prevalent in purchases of cars, trucks, and 
even the construction of factories.  But the traditional view is that it affects oil consumption only 
through economic activity and the price of oil.  I argue that credit is important in its own right.  
To make my case, I first show that an association between credit and oil consumption growth 
exists across countries and time.  I then give a nod to the traditional view, and conclude by 
showing that changes in credit alter oil consumption—even after accounting for economic 
activity and oil prices. 
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Introduction 
Few of us walk into a car dealership, throw a stack of $100 bills on the table, and drive off into 
the sunset.  No, we buy on credit.  Even after choosing the car, and then haggling with the 
salesman on price, most of us trudge to a different room and fill out still more paperwork to get a 
loan.  We also tend to fuel that car using credit.  Companies are no different: many finance the 
purchases of capital assets—such as vehicles—by taking on debt.  In general, credit is an 
important factor in determining the amount of oil we buy.  But when it comes to understanding 
or explaining oil consumption, credit is like marijuana—commonly used but rarely 
acknowledged.3 
 
The typical suspects for such explanations are economic activity and oil prices.  For longer-term 
trends you can throw in government policies such vehicle fuel economy standards or 
technological change like the development of electric cars.  The implicit assumption in this 
traditional view is that the impact of credit on oil consumption is tied up with economic activity, 
and because credit growth tends to rise and fall with the economy there is no need to account for 
it separately. 
 
On the face of it this makes sense: consumer vehicle purchases and firm investment also tend to 
move up and down with the economy.  These are generally times when asset prices are high as 
well, which can further reinforce such consumption and investment.  Yet there are other aspects 
of credit demand and supply that are not directly related to economic activity.  For example, oil 
producers may take on debt to maintain or increase current production and to invest for the 
future.  Either depends on the availability and price of credit—not solely economic activity.  And 
these actions affect the oil price, which influences its consumption. 
 
In some countries there is also a feedback loop, whereby credit flows from oil exporting 
countries fund oil consumption by allowing for cheaper and more wide-spread borrowing by 
domestic consumers and firms.  This helps to push up oil prices, which then further increases 
capital flows and lowers the cost of credit because oil exporters push even more of their savings 
into the global financial system, and this again increases oil consumption, and so on.  Finally, 
movements of financial capital across countries influence exchange rates, which alters the local 
price of oil in most countries, also leading to changes in oil consumption. 
 
In this paper I show through various methods that credit helps in accounting for and 
understanding oil consumption—above and beyond its impact on economic activity or oil prices.  
I first use scatterplots and correlations to establish an association between credit and oil 
consumption growth across countries and over time, at both annual and quarterly frequencies.  I 
then demonstrate that—depending upon model specification and frequency of the data—changes 
in credit can either predict oil consumption growth, or changes in real GDP growth, which then 
predict oil consumption growth.  This is consistent with the traditional view of how credit 
impacts oil consumption. 
 
I finish by showing that credit can account for changes in oil consumption directly, not just 
because it alters economic activity.  To do so, I estimate a multivariate model that shows an 
unexpected increase in credit affects oil consumption, even after accounting for growth in real 
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GDP and the oil price.  A 10% increase in credit in this model increases oil consumption by just 
over 1% over the first year, rising to slightly below 3% by the fifth. 
 
Oil Consumption, Credit, and Economic Growth 
The majority of oil consumed around the world—a bit less than 60%—is for the transportation of 
people or goods.4  It fuels the cars we drive, the trucks that move our food and clothing, and the 
boats which deliver our electronics and commodities.  The other big chunk—around 35%—is 
consumed by firms to produce goods.  These are the plastics which seem to be in everything we 
use, fertilizers that aid farmers in growing fruits and vegetables, and also the asphalt which paves 
our highways and driveways. 
 
Underlying these end-uses for oil are fundamental factors, sometimes called determinants, which 
help to make sense of observed and potential oil consumption.  These include consumer 
preferences, government policies, the number of people that will consume oil, the state of the 
economy, the price of oil or oil products and any close substitutes, and the technologies available 
either for using oil or producing goods with it. 
 
Some of these determinants are difficult to quantify—particularly consumer preferences, 
government policies, and available technologies.  Reliable data is unavailable in many countries 
for others, such as the price of oil products or close substitutes.  This generally leaves the state of 
the economy and price of oil as variables which can be used to understand and/or forecast oil 
consumption.  The variable which stands in for the state of the economy is usually inflation-
adjusted, or real, gross domestic product (GDP), while some type of benchmark—Brent or West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI)—typically represents the oil price. 
 
Of course these are general observations—specific analysts employ all different types of 
variables, explicitly or implicitly, in order to explain oil consumption.  Some may use a different 
benchmark oil price, others might gather gasoline prices, and still others could use some type of 
industrial production index instead of real GDP.  The details will vary based on data availability, 
country, and the time-frame under consideration.  But it is very unusual to see any references to 
credit when accounting for oil consumption. 
 
Why does credit matter for oil consumption?  For starters, it eases the purchase of things that use 
oil.  Consumers, firms, and even governments can purchase vehicles—car, trucks, boats, ships—
on credit that might otherwise be unobtainable.  The more vehicles that are sold, the greater oil 
consumption is likely to be.  Companies or governments might also use credit to build factories 
that use oil as an input, such as chemical plants. 
 
Growth in credit can also increase economic activity, which results in greater oil consumption 
because people and firms buy more vehicles with higher income, consumers tend to travel more 
as well, and firms need to transport a greater number of goods.  There may also be a knock-on 
effect from credit growth to asset prices—real estate and equities in particular—and there is a 
well-known wealth effect where consumer purchases rise with asset prices (Shen et. al, 2015). 
 
                                                 
4 See the International Energy Agency’s energy statistics at http://www.iea.org/statistics/. 
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Another channel is through oil supply.  The ability of oil producers—both private and public—to 
get loans will help to determine both current production and investment (Caruana, 2016).  Some 
oil producers in the U.S. are currently relying on bank loans and bond sales to finance ongoing 
production; others are producing in the low-price environment at a loss to repay such loans.  This 
additional supply, which would not be possible without such debt, helps to keep current prices 
down, pushing up consumption.  And many state-owned oil companies have taken on debt in 
recent years as well, ostensibly to finance large investments in future production, which affects 
future oil prices and consumption (Caruana, 2016). 
 
There is also the so-called commodity-credit feedback loop.5  The basic idea here is that oil 
exporting countries have funds in excess of domestic needs to invest in foreign markets because 
of higher oil prices (petrodollars).  These tend to bid up global asset prices, but also make credit 
more accessible in certain emerging markets (via lower interest rates, a smaller risk premium, 
etc.).  Consumers and firms in these countries use such credit for purchases that increase oil 
consumption.  This raises oil prices, and oil exporters then have even more funds to invest, 
which makes credit even easier, and so on. 
 
A final channel is through exchange rates.  Flows of capital across countries, which directly 
impact credit cost and availability, have an impact on exchange rates.  And because oil is priced 
in dollars, such changes in currency values may alter oil consumption (Bruno and Shin, 2014). 
 
These channels are nice, you may be thinking, but aren’t changes in economic activity sufficient 
to account for any impacts credit has on oil consumption?  I don’t believe so, and provide 
specific evidence for that below.  But I don’t find this conceptually satisfactory either, as the 
relationship between credit and economic growth is not as straightforward as it might seem. 
 
There are three general ways in which the financial sector and the so-called real economy impact 
each other: (i) through the assets and liabilities of consumers, which can affect purchases of 
goods and services; (ii) through the assets and liabilities of banks or other financial 
intermediaries, which can affect their supply of credit to consumers and firms; and (iii) through 
the ability of financial intermediaries and consumers to sell or buy assets without substantial 
changes in price, sometimes referred to as liquidity (BCBS, 2011).   
 
Recent research has overwhelmingly supported the view that financial factors, through the 
channels outlined above, make an important contribution to changes in real GDP—across 
countries and time (Jorda et. al, 2012).  But this research also emphasizes that credit and 
economic growth do not move together in lock-step, and it is unclear that one is fully driving 
movements in the other (Claessens et. al, 2012).  Additionally, the impacts of credit on growth, 
or the reverse, can depend upon the country or countries being considered, particularly in terms 
of their policies on capital flows and stage of development (Garcia-Escribano and Han, 2015).   
 
                                                 
5 This name comes from the FT Alphaville blog (subscription required), which has many excellent discussions of 
this topic and its potential ramifications.  See specifically: http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/10/12/2141989/the-
commodity-credit-feedback-loop/ and the links at the bottom.   
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I believe these caveats, along with the importance of credit for financing oil consumption 
outlined above, make a compelling case for assessing its usefulness in analyzing and accounting 
for oil consumption.  I take this up in the next section. 
 
Results 
I use four different methods in this section to dive into the relationship between oil consumption 
and credit.  I begin with scatterplots and correlations, move to statistical tests of predictability, 
and then estimate a multivariate model.  Throughout the analysis I use two different panel data 
sets, one that is annual and the other quarterly.  Appendix 1 fully details the countries in each 
panel and specifics on the data series. 
 
The annual panel covers 39 countries and includes a total of 738 observations between 1980 and 
2014.  The analysis uses only 652 observations because I have restricted the growth rates of each 
series to lie between -20% and 20% to minimize the impact of outliers.  The quarterly panel 
includes a total of 1776 observations between 2002Q1 and 2015Q2 for 36 countries.  As with the 
panel using annual data, I have restricted the growth rates in each series, in this case to lie 
between -25% and 25%, which leaves 1657 observations for the analysis.6 
 
Associations 
Figure 1 shows scatterplots of growth in oil consumption and credit based on the unbalanced 
panel of annual data.  The central tendency across plots is a positive relationship: as credit 
growth rises oil consumption growth tends to as well.  This relationship is strongest when both 
series are contemporaneous (top-left), and then weakens when credit growth is lagged by one 
(top-right), two (bottom-left), and three years (bottom-right). 
                                                 
6 The upper and lower bounds are slightly higher than with the annual panel in order to increase the number of 
observations in individual countries. 
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Figure 1: Scatterplots of annual growth in oil consumption and lags of credit growth for the annual panel 
of 39 countries 
 
Source: EIA, BIS, Author calculations 
 
The best-fit lines associated with the scatterplots of the annual panel are consistent with 
correlations between the series (Table 1).7  The contemporaneous correlation coefficient between 
the series is 0.30.  This falls to 0.23 when credit growth lags by one period, is 0.20 when credit 
growth lags by two years, and drops to 0.19 when it is three years behind oil consumption 
growth. 
 
Table 1: Correlation coefficients between oil consumption and various lags of credit growth 
 Contemporaneous 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
Annual 0.30 0.23 0.20 0.19 
Quarterly 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.12 
 
The scatterplots based on the unbalanced quarterly panel show a similar pattern to the annual one 
(Figure 2).  As before, the best-fit lines indicate a positive relationship between year-on-year 
growth in credit and oil consumption.  In contrast to the annual data, however, the slope of the 
best-fit line remains about the same irrespective of whether credit growth is contemporaneous 
with oil consumption growth, or if it is lagged by two or three years.  The line is slightly flatter 
when credit growth is lagged by one year. 
                                                 
7 I use rank-based non-parametric (Spearman) correlations to better account for any non-linearities and remaining 
outliers in the relationship between the series. 
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Figure 2: Scatterplots of annual growth in oil consumption and lags of credit growth for the quarterly 
panel of 36 countries 
 
Source: JODI, BIS, Author calculations 
 
The correlations fit this arrangement as well, although they show less association between the 
series than equivalent values from the annual panel (Table 1).  The contemporaneous correlation 
is 0.11, it falls to 0.07 when credit growth is lagged by one year, rises again to 0.11 when it is 
lagged two years, and is 0.12 when credit growth is three years behind oil consumption growth. 
 
Granger Causality Tests 
Another way to study the relationship between credit and oil consumption growth is to test 
whether changes in credit growth are able to predict changes in oil consumption growth.  To do 
this, I use multivariate Granger Causality (GC) tests with both the annual and quarterly panels.8  
The results are summarized in Table 2 for three different model specifications. 
 
Table 2: Does credit growth Granger Cause oil consumption growth? 
 2 Variables 3 Variables 4 Variables 
Annual Yes Yes No 
Quarterly Yes No No 
 
The first model, labeled 2 variables, tests whether credit growth can predict oil consumption 
growth when these are the only two variables in the model.  The second model, 3 variables, 
conducts the same test but also adds real GDP growth to the specification.  And the final model, 
four variables, adds growth in nominal oil prices on top of that. 
 
                                                 
8 Based upon the Schwartz Criterion, I use 2 lags for the annual panel and 8 lags for quarterly. 
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The results with annual data—at the 90% confidence level—show that changes in credit are able 
to predict changes in oil consumption with either the two or three variables models, but not with 
the four variable one.  However, changes in credit are able to predict both real GDP growth and 
oil price growth in the four variable model.  The two and three variable models highlight the 
direct impact of credit on oil consumption, whereas the results from the four variable one show 
the importance of the traditional channel through economic activity and oil prices. 
 
The quarterly results are slightly different.  Here, credit growth only predicts oil consumption 
growth for the two variable model, and it only predicts real GDP growth for the three variable 
model.  Credit growth also does not predict real GDP or oil price growth in the four variable 
model, but changes in oil prices are also unable to predict oil consumption growth in that 
particular specification.  Although not as strong as with the annual panel, the quarterly GC tests 
still highlight the indirect impacts of credit on oil consumption. 
 
Vector Autoregressive Models 
I move next to a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model in order to assess the impact of credit 
changes on oil consumption while accounting for both economic activity and the price of oil.  As 
above, I use both the annual and quarterly panels, and my VAR model is estimated on the growth 
rates of four variables: oil consumption, credit, real GDP, and the oil price.9 
 
The two plots in Figure 3 show the response of oil consumption to an unexpected increase in 
credit over five years (the annual panel is to the left, quarterly to the right).10  The responses are 
accumulated, meaning that the value in a given year is the total impact of the initial increase in 
credit on oil consumption up to that point.  The solid lines are the estimated responses and the 
dashed lines surrounding them are confidence intervals. 
 
For the annual panel, oil consumption rises after an unexpected increase in credit, and continues 
to increase over five years.  Because the model accounts for GDP and the oil price when 
estimating this response, it is consistent with my contention that credit affects oil consumption 
directly, outside of its indirect importance for economic activity or oil prices.  The plots in Figure 
3 are responses of oil consumption to an increase in credit that has the magnitude of one standard 
deviation.  In more meaningful terms, they imply that a 1% increase in credit raises oil 
consumption by 0.12% after one year, growing to 0.28% after five years. 
                                                 
9 Based upon the Schwartz Criterion, I use 2 lags for the annual panel and 8 lags for quarterly. 
10 These are generalized impulse responses, which show the response of a variable to a one-time unexpected change 
in the error term associated with any of the equations in the VAR model.  The impulses to each error term are 
constructed so that they are uncorrelated with each other and have a magnitude of one standard deviation (of the 
error term being changed).  For more on generalized impulse responses see Pesaran and Shin (1998). 
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Figure 3: Response of oil consumption to a change in credit from the annual (left) and quarterly (right) 
VAR models based on each respective panel. 
        
Source: EIA, JODI, BIS, Author calculations 
 
The response of the VAR model based on the quarterly panel looks different to the annual one, 
but is actually quite similar.  Here, oil consumption also increases after one year due to the initial 
rise in credit, and it continues to grow over the five year period.  And the magnitudes are almost 
exactly the same: a 1% increase in credit results in a 0.13% increase in oil consumption after a 
year, rising to 0.27% after five years. 
 
Conclusion 
The scatterplots and correlations for both panels—annual and quarterly—indicate there is a 
positive association between credit and oil consumption growth across countries and time.  The 
Granger Causality tests further reinforce this notion, and highlight the importance of the indirect 
channels through which credit affects oil consumption, namely via economic activity and oil 
prices.  Finally, the VAR model shows that there is a direct channel from credit to oil 
consumption, even after accounting for real GDP and the price of oil. 
 
My analysis is subject to numerous caveats and leaves open many avenues for future research.  
The most important of these is that I have used panel data and there is always the chance that a 
few countries have dominated the results.  An extension to the country level would be welcome.  
I also made several decisions on model specification—the number of lags, the cut-off points for 
outliers, and the like—which have an impact on results.  Finally, I have relied exclusively on 
linear frameworks that are parametric in nature.  A non-linear/non-parametric analysis would be 
another useful extension. 
 
Still, taken together, the associations, tests of predictability, and multivariate model demonstrate 
that there is a role for credit in explaining changes in oil consumption that goes above and 
beyond credit’s impact on economic activity or oil prices.  But that importance has to be 
recognized, or as the author Jack Canfield says, ‘you can’t heal what you don’t acknowledge.’ 
  
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
1 2 3 4 5
Years
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Quarters
10 
 
References 
Arora, Vipin, “Consumer Credit, Oil Prices, and the U.S. Economy,” Turkish Economic Review, 
3(1), 2016, p. 122-142. 
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/a/ksp/journ2/v3y2016i1p121-142.html. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), “The Transmission Channels Between the 
Financial and Real Sectors: A Critical Survey of the Literature,” BCBS Working Paper No 18, 
2011. 
URL: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp18.htm. 
 
Bruno, Valentina and Hyun Song Shin, “Capital Flows and the Risk-Taking Channel of 
Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 71, 2015, p. 119-132. 
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393214001688. 
 
Caruana, Jaime, “Credit, Commodities and Currencies,” Lecture given at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 5 February 2016. 
URL: https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp160205.htm. 
 
Claessens, Stijn, M. Ayhan Kose, and Marco E. Terrones, “How do Business and Financial 
Cycles Interact?” Journal of International Economics, 87(1), 2012, p. 178-190. 
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199611001462. 
 
Garcia-Escribano, Mercedes and Fei Han, “Credit Expansion in Emerging Markets: Propeller of 
Growth?” IMF Working Paper 15/212, 2015. 
URL: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43318.0. 
 
Jorda, Oscar, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor, “When Credit Bites Back,” Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 45(s2), 2013, p. 3-28. 
URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jmcb.12069/pdf. 
 
Pesaran, H. Hashim, and Yongcheol Shin, “Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in Linear 
Multivariate Models,” Economics Letters, 58 (1), 1998, p. 17-29. 
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176597002140. 
 
Shen, Xin, Mark J. Holmes, and Steven Lim, “Wealth Effects and Consumption: A Panel VAR 
Approach,” Applied Economics, 29(2), 2015, p. 221-237. 
URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02692171.2014.983050. 
  
11 
 
Appendix 1: Data 
The data on credit are all from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), specifically their 
series on total credit to the non-financial sector.11  The values are available for 39 countries from 
varying starting points through the second quarter of 2015 (the last update to the data used in the 
analysis was in December 2015).  The quarterly values are converted to annual by taking an 
average of the end-of-quarter stocks for each year; annual series are available through 2014.  The 
specific series used are the market value of credit for all non-financial sectors in billions of local 
currency at current prices, adjusted for breaks. 
 
The data on oil consumption are taken from two different sources.  Annual series are from the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) international energy statistics.12  These are 
available in thousands of barrels per day.  The quarterly numbers are from the Joint 
Organisations Data Initiative (JODI), and are converted to thousands of barrels per day.13  EIA 
series begin in 1980, JODI in the first quarter of 2002. 
 
Real GDP for each of these countries are from Oxford Economics, and available in millions of 
local currency for the year 2010 (not seasonally adjusted).  The oil price is the spot price of Brent 
Crude in current dollars, and comes from EIA. 
 
Table 3 lists the countries included in the analysis, the frequencies for which data is available, 
and starting dates for the BIS series (EIA are available from 1980, JODI from 2002Q1).  For 
calculations with annual data only those series with the full year available are included. 
 
Table 3: Countries, frequencies, and BIS starting dates 
Country Frequency BIS starting date 
Argentina Quarterly and Annual 1992Q4 
Australia Quarterly and Annual 1988Q2 
Austria Quarterly and Annual 1999Q1 
Belgium Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Brazil Quarterly and Annual 1998Q1 
Canada Quarterly and Annual 1991Q1 
China Quarterly and Annual 1995Q4 
Czech Republic Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Denmark Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Finland Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
France Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Germany Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Greece Quarterly and Annual 1999Q1 
Hong Kong Annual 1998Q3 
Hungary Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
India Quarterly and Annual 1981Q1 
Indonesia Quarterly and Annual 2001Q4 
                                                 
11 See http://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm. 
12 See http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm. 
13 See https://www.jodidata.org/. 
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Ireland Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Italy Quarterly and Annual 1999Q1 
Japan Quarterly and Annual 1997Q4 
Korea Quarterly and Annual 1990Q4 
Luxembourg Annual 2002Q1 
Malaysia Quarterly and Annual 1967Q1 
Mexico Quarterly and Annual 1990Q4 
Netherlands Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Norway Quarterly and Annual 1995Q3 
Poland Quarterly and Annual 1999Q1 
Portugal Quarterly and Annual 1998Q4 
Russia Quarterly and Annual 1999Q4 
Saudi Arabia Quarterly and Annual 1999Q4 
Singapore Annual 1990Q1 
South Africa Quarterly and Annual 1965Q1 
Spain Quarterly and Annual 1995Q1 
Sweden Quarterly and Annual 1999Q1 
Switzerland Quarterly and Annual 1995Q4 
Thailand Quarterly and Annual 1997Q1 
Turkey Quarterly and Annual 2001Q1 
UK Quarterly and Annual 1999Q1 
US Quarterly and Annual 1952Q1 
 
